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THE INTERRELATION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INQUIRIES 
 
 
PAULINE COLLINS* 
 
I have learnt that the relationship of the military justice system to the broader systems of statute and common law is a fascinating topic. Our military-specific microcosm clearly reflects the delicate balance between executive authority, human rights and judicial power which is the foundation of the rule of law in our society. 
David Morrison1 
I   INTRODUCTION 
On 28 August 2012, an Australian platoon of 24 soldiers travelled 23 
kilometres north of Tarin Kowt to Wahab Patrol Base in Afghanistan to join an 
Afghan National Army (‘ANA’) outpost in Taliban territory. The mission was to 
engage in a 10 day mentor exercise with the ANA and to assist coordination with 
others in the region. On the evening of 29 August 2012, a single ANA soldier, 
Sergeant Hekmatullah, attacked the Australian soldiers while they were relaxing 
and playing cards. Hekmatullah fired from an M16-A2 assault rifle, fatally 
wounding Sapper James Martin aged 21, Private Robert Poate aged 23 and Lance 
Corporal Stjepan Milosevic aged 40 years, and injuring two others. 
These kinds of attacks have been described as ‘green on blue’ or ‘insider 
attacks’ and such killings account for 7 of the 40 deaths of Australians serving  
in Afghanistan to March 2015.2 Such attacks, although resulting in a smaller 
number of casualties overall, often result in high casualty numbers from a single 
incident. They disturb the conduct of peacekeeping and post conflict operations 
                                                 
*  Associate Professor, School of Law and Justice, University of Southern Queensland. The author would 
like to thank Professor A.D Gray of the University of Southern Queensland for his helpful comments and 
the editors and anonymous referees for their insights and suggestions. All errors remain the author’s. 
1  Lieutenant General David Morrison, ‘Chief of Army Address to the Australian Army Legal Corps 
Conference’ (Speech delivered at the Australian Army Legal Corps Conference, 3 October 2013) 
<http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Speeches-and-transcripts/Chief-of-Army-address-to-the-Australian-
Army-Legal-Corps>. 
2 Battle Casualties in Afghanistan, Australian Government Department of Defence <http://www.defence. 
gov.au/operations/afghanistan/personnel.asp>. Australians killed in ‘green on blue’ attacks were Lance 
Corporal Andrew Jones on 30 May 2011; Captain Bryce Duffy, Corporal Ashley Birt, and Lance 
Corporal Luke Gavin on 29 October 2011, with another seven injured in that incident; and Lance 
Corporal Stjepan Milosevic, Sapper James Martin, Private Robert Poate on 29 August 2012, with another 
two injured in that incident. 
90 UNSW Law Journal Volume 40(1) 
as they undermine trust and inhibit the mission of training and handover to local 
military personnel.3  
The fatal shooting of the three soldiers on 29 August 2012 resulted in an 
Inquiry Officer Inquiry (‘IOI’) being established by the Chief of the Defence 
Force to report on the facts and circumstances of the incident. This method of 
inquiry was described as ‘a quick, cheap, opaque and relatively low-level inquiry 
method … rather than the mandatory Chief of Defence’s Commission of 
Inquiry’.4 
The Inquiry was conducted by an unnamed colonel and a redacted version, 
available in the public domain, made a number of findings regarding the conduct 
of the operation, none of which were considered to be causal factors contributing 
to the deaths. 5  Consequent upon the families’ demands, a civilian coronial 
inquest was held in Queensland in 2014–15.6 It is generally rare in Australia to 
have a civilian body inquire into the death of soldiers and actions of military 
personnel in a conflict zone.7  
In 2005, the Senate Inquiry into ‘The Effectiveness of Australia’s  
Military Justice System’ (‘Senate Inquiry 2005’) 8  presented one of the most 
comprehensive reports to date on military inquiries in Australia. Many witnesses 
complained at the processes operating within the Australian Defence Force 
(‘ADF’) inquiry system at the time. 9  A former ADF member’s comments 
encapsulate the criticisms: ‘The bottom line is really quite easy to state: the 
Defence Force … cannot investigate itself on the one hand and defend itself on 
the other. This simply cannot be done fairly, without bias, thoroughly or 
properly’.10 
                                                 
3 The US has suffered greater numbers of casualties from ‘green on blue’ attacks: Bill Roggio and Lisa 
Lundquist, Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan: The Data (17 May 2016) Foundation for Defence of 
Democracies Long War Journal <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_ 
attack.php#ixzz3Os6Mn9s6>. 
4  Sarah Elks, ‘ADF Ordered Cheap, Opaque Inquiry into Diggers’ Deaths, Inquest Hears’, The Australian 
(online), 14 October 2014 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/adf-ordered-cheap-opaque-inquiry-
into-diggers-deaths-inquest-hears/news-story/f31b532f2cb41b1f6b5f96c2d75a30e7>.  
5  ‘Inquiry Officer’s Report into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding a Shooting Incident in 
Afghanistan that Resulted in the Deaths of LCPL S Milosevic, SPR JT Martin and PTE RHF Poate and 
Injuries to Other Australian Soldiers on or about 29 August 12’ (Report, Australian Defence Force, 28 
February 2013) <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/coi/reports/IOReportInsiderAttack 
29Aug12.pdf> (‘Wahab Inquiry’). 
6  See Inquest into the Deaths of James Thomas Martin, Robert Hugh Frederick Poate, Stjepan Rick 
Milosevic (unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland, 22 September 2015) (‘Milosevic et al’). 
7 The 2008 NSW coronial inquest into Pte Jake Kovco’s death in Iraq in 2006 was the last such coronial 
inquest. This inquest was surrounded by a great deal of controversy: see, eg, ABC Radio, ‘Coroner 
Criticises Media over Kovco Reports’, The World Today, 17 October 2007 (Eleanor Middleton); 
Malcolm Brown, ‘Soldier Refuses to Answer Kovco Inquest Questions’, Brisbane Times (online), 13 
March 2008 <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/national/soldier-refuses-to-answer-kovco-inquest-
questions/2008/03/12/1205126014164.html>. 
8  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Parliament of Australia, The 
Effectiveness of Australia’s Military Justice System (2005). 
9 Ibid 166 [8.70]–[8.71]. 
10 Evidence to Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Adelaide, 29 April 2004, 4, quoted in ibid 163 [8.62].  
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In 2011, another major suite of reviews and audits were commissioned within 
the ADF.11 These have resulted in acceptance of some recommended changes, in 
particular in regard to the Inspector-General ADF (‘IGADF’) being given 
responsibility for inquiry into service-related deaths and an enhanced separation 
from the chain of command to ensure greater efficiency and integrity.12 However, 
with the findings of the coroner in the Milosevic et al inquest in 2015, it is now 
timely to consider further the relationship between military and civilian inquiries 
into military deaths. Although a different jurisdiction, the UK experience of 
coronial inquests into military events, where the requirements of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 (‘Convention’)13 and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) apply, see increasing 
expectations of family members for greater transparency and rights. This is 
informative for the Australian context. While Australia is not subject to the 
Convention or similar human rights legislation at the federal level, and a direct 
comparison is therefore not available, the Senate Inquiry 2005 saw fit to look to 
common law countries with similar military inquiry arrangements so that we may 
learn from their experience. This is important as Australia participates in 
multinational forces with Convention countries’ military forces, such as the UK. 
The cases provide insight for future possibilities involving interaction between 
the civilian and military legal systems. They acknowledge the interaction of 
international humanitarian law (‘IHL’) and human rights law (‘HRL’). This is a 
matter that has caused consternation for the UK Ministry of Defence (‘MoD’).14 
Likewise, the ADF has reportedly exhibited discomfort with a coronial inquest 
into the death of soldiers in a conflict zone.15  
The demands for human rights and the influence such concerns have on 
bereaved parents of military personnel are growing concerns in the Australian 
environment. Civilian values are at play in the increasing demand for transparent 
investigations such as coronial inquests into deaths in the military. This article 
reports the circumstances of the events leading up to the coronial inquest into the 
deaths of the three Australian service personnel on 29 August 2012, in 
                                                 
11  Secretary of Defence, ‘Re-thinking Systems of Inquiry, Investigation, Review and Audit in Defence: 
Report on Stage A (Department of Defence, 1 August 2012); Secretary of Defence, ‘Re-thinking Systems 
of Inquiry, Investigation, Review and Audit in Defence: Report on Stage B: Models (Department of 
Defence, 28 February 2014) <http://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/Reviews/SystemsInquiry/>; Geoff 
Earley, ‘Review of the Management of Incidents and Complaints in Defence Including Civil and Military 
Jurisdiction’ (Report, Inspector General Australian Defence Force, 6 September 2011); Roger Gyles, 
‘HMAS Success Commission of Inquiry Allegations of Unacceptable Behaviour and the Management 
Thereof’ (Redacted Report, Department of Defence, 23 December 2011). 
12 See Defence Legislation Amendment (Military Justice Enhancements – Inspector-General ADF) Act 2015 
(Cth); Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Regulation 2016 (Cth); Defence Legislation 
(Enhancement of Military Justice) Act 2015 (Cth). 
13  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
14 See, eg, Thomas Tugendhat and Laura Croft, The Fog of Law: An Introduction to the Legal Erosion of 
British Fighting Power (Policy Exchange, 2013) 24 <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/09/the-fog-of-law.pdf>. 
15  Vanda Carson, ‘Army Commander Accused of Intimidating Families of Dead Soldiers’, The Courier 
Mail (online), 24 October 2014 <http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/army-commander-
accused-of-intimidating-families-of-dead-soldiers/story-fnihsrf2-1227101440193>.  
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Afghanistan while on active duty. The article considers the UK experience when 
looking to any lessons learned in light of the coronial inquest in Queensland. The 
responses of bereaved families to military inquiries into deaths of soldiers have 
been the subject of research in Israel. This research suggests further lessons for 
civil–military relations (‘CMR’), including consideration of the consequences 
that arise from the interaction between military and civilian inquiry systems. The 
Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) (‘DI Regulations’), Inspector-General 
of the Australian Defence Force Regulation 2016 (Cth) and the Defence Force 
Ombudsman govern all administrative inquiries, sanctions and grievance or 
complaint processes within the ADF, except for routine inquiries. This is distinct 
from the separate military discipline system which operates in a quasi-criminal 
environment. The focus of this article is on the administrative inquiry process. 
The article addresses the reactions by both the civilian families and the ADF to 
the military IOI, and the civilian coroner’s findings. It argues that greater civilian 
scrutiny and integration will improve military accountability, operational 
effectiveness, reduce litigation risk and lessen pain, cost and loss – particularly to 
families of deceased members. First, it sets out a brief overview of the wider 
context within which this debate should be understood, namely the extent to 
which civil legal norms or structures apply to the military as a consideration of 
overall CMR. 
 
II   CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS 
Janowitz, a sociologist, maintained that for CMR to experience a positive 
outcome, military values must align more with civilian values.16 To do this they 
must be open to changing values. An isolated military, such as an all-volunteer 
professional military, can more easily lose sight of these values than perhaps a 
military comprised of citizen-soldiers. In the case of the UK and Israel, the 
former comprised of all-volunteer soldiers and the latter a citizen-soldier 
conscripted military, both contain a world of legislated and protected human 
rights. In Australia, an all-volunteer professional military force operates in an 
environment where no federal legislated or entrenched bill of rights exists. 
Former Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Morrison emphasised the need for 
discussion as to how our disciplinary and legal frameworks cope with a much more individualistic workforce most of whom are avid users of social media. Both of these trends empower individuals, but at considerable risk to the reputation of the Army.17 
A separated military and civilian legal system does not support the 
integration of civilian and military values. The military experience of an all-
volunteer force can create a disjuncture between citizen and soldier, what Feaver 
                                                 
16  Morris J Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Free Press, 2nd ed, 1960) 10, 
39. 
17  Morrison, above n 1, 6. 
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and Kohn refer to as the ‘civil–military gap’.18 This gap refers to the differing 
values of military and civilian society and how this influences both military 
effectiveness and the polity as regards upholding democratic principles. Greater 
difference in values and culture increases the opportunity for misunderstanding, 
and in turn the likelihood of isolation and development of a separate military 
society.19 
While military discipline, including administrative sanction, is said to have 
undergone a ‘civilianisation’20 – a process that brings the military system into 
closer alignment with fundamental concepts available in the civilian system – it 
remains separate and outside the constitutional Chapter III Courts in Australia.21 
In the situation of inquiries, for instance, under the DI Regulations, the 
investigating officer in the Wahab Inquiry, a non-lawyer, remained protected 
from testifying at the inquest because he had the ‘immunity of a High Court 
judge’.22  
In the changing environment in which wars are fought, states are defended 
and soldiers are recruited, there is need for consideration of CMR. 23  Civil–
military theory requires the civil control of the military, and is the operating 
principle by which the military works under civilian institutions of governance 
and through which military power is contained vis-a-vis the individual. The 
principle holds a tension between the demand that a force is strong and 
disciplined in order to defend society, but also that the military is not so strong as 
to threaten the society it protects. This latter aspect not only demands an 
understanding of the society’s behavioural expectations, but also that a strong 
institutional respect for the separation of powers ensures balanced power is 
maintained.  
Arguments for separate treatment based on ‘command and control’ and the 
exceptional nature of the activities undertaken by particular bodies, such as the 
military, are used to justify exclusion of groups from normal civilian 
procedures.24 These exceptions highlight the need for careful scrutiny of why and 
                                                 
18  Peter D Feaver and Richard H Kohn, ‘Conclusion: The Gap and What It Means For American National 
Security’ in Peter D Feaver and Richard H Kohn (eds), Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil–Military Gap 
and American National Security (MIT Press, 2001) 459. 
19  See, eg, Andrew Podger, Catherine Harris and Rodger Powell, ‘Final Report of the Learning Culture 
Inquiry: Inquiry into the Learning Culture in ADF Schools and Training Establishments’ (Report, 
Australian Defence Force, July 2006). 
20  Gerry R Rubin, ‘United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, Juridification’ (2002) 65 
Modern Law Review 36. 
21  See Alison Duxbury, ‘Comments: The Defence Power, Chapter III and White v Director of Military 
Prosecutions (2007) 235 ALR 455; [2007] HCA 29’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review 233, 233; Kathryn 
Cochrane, ‘Lane v Morrison [2009] HCA 29’ (2010) 61 Australian Institute of Administrative Law 
Forum 62, 67. 
22 Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) reg 61(1). See also Secretary of Defence, ‘Re-thinking Systems 
of Inquiry, Investigation, Review and Audit in Defence (Stage B): Annex B: Model Development’ 
(Report, Department of Defence, 28 February 2014) 33 [4.2.18]. 
23  See, eg, Michael C Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (John 
Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
24  See Administrative Review Council, ‘Federal Judicial Review in Australia’ (Report No 50, September 
2012) 220–1 (Recommendation B21), 249 (Recommendation C24). 
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how the civilian realm should control the military. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
take account of how these institutional positions are likely to impact on CMR.25  
If important lessons are forgotten or actions never properly investigated or 
taken, this can have an adverse effect on CMR that should not be overlooked. 
Soldiers and citizens represent the two sides of CMR, and what happens to either 
one affects the health of the relationship. Civilians may have lost sight of the 
principles involved here, not to mention the importance of monitoring a military 
that acts in their name.26 In turn, military personnel may become disillusioned 
with the society they defend.27 When civilians are out of touch with military 
operations, the military risks developing a lack of respect for their civil 
governance. 28  This sense of alienation from citizens has been expressed by 
Australian Defence Association members: ‘Many Australians are completely 
disengaged from their defence force on a day-to-day basis’.29 
Until such time as this ‘nettle is grasped’, bereaved parents are likely to 
increase their demands for open civilian investigations. Most concerning is the 
unacknowledged potential consequences of failure by government to establish 
the proper systems to transparently investigate ADF incidents and deaths which 
may ultimately lead to further threats to ADF personnel. Upholding the Geneva 
Conventions and observing human rights through proper and transparent 
oversight that engages civilian values is connected to stopping the payback 
motive of insider attacks. The Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
(‘DSTO’) Cultural Study30 demonstrated that cultural ‘slights’ may induce insider 
attacks. Thus, far from protecting the state’s national interests, not dealing with 
these matters in an open and transparent manner may result in future violent 
                                                 
25  See, eg, Harry Evans, ‘The Senate, Accountability and Government Control’ (Papers on Parliament No 
48, Parliamentary Studies Centre, Australian National University, 16 November 2007); Bruce George and 
J David Morgan, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Defence’ (1999) 5 Journal of Legislative Studies 1. 
26  See, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio National, ‘Modern Warfare’, Public Forum from the 
Perth Writers’ Festival, 26 March 2013 (Phillip Adams). 
27 See Glen Segell, ‘The Nation-State, Nationalism, and Civil–Military Relations Theory’ in Constantine P 
Danopoulos, Dhirendra Vajpeyi and Amir Bar-or (eds), Civil–Military Relations, Nation-Building, and 
National Identity: Comparative Perspectives (Praeger Publishers, 2004) 51–2. See also Anthony Forster, 
‘The Military Covenant and British Civil–Military Relations: Letting the Genie Out of the Bottle’ (2012) 
38 Armed Forces & Society 273. 
28 See Glenn Sulmasy and John Yoo, ‘Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational Choice 
Approach to the War on Terror’ (2007) 54 University of California Law Review 1815; Andrew J 
Bacevich and Richard H Kohn, ‘Grand Army of the Republicans: Has the US Military Become a Partisan 
Force?’ (1997) 217(23) The New Republic 22. 
29  Editorial, ‘Disengagement, Deficient Debate and Defeat’ (2007) 24(1) Defender 1. See also Australian 
National University, ‘Public Opinion Towards Governance: Results from the Inaugural ANU Poll’ (poll 
findings, 2008) <http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/2008-04-16_ANU 
poll_governance_report_0.pdf>. In 2008 the least popular areas of government expenditure included the 
military, culture and the arts, and unemployment benefits: at 12. See also Ian McAllister, ‘Public 
Priorities for Government Expenditure’ (Report No 15, ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences, 
January 2014) 4 <http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANU_Attitudes 
PollExpenditureReport_0.pdf>. 
30  Defence Science and Technology Organisation, ‘Cultural Compatibility Study’ (Report, Department of 
Defence, 22 June 2012) 2 <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/coi/reports/DSTO%20Cultural%20 
Compatibility%20Study.pdf>. See also David A Arenas, ‘Inside the Wire Threats – Afghanistan: Green-
on-Blue’ (Handbook No 12-07, Centre for Army Lessons Learned, February 2012).  
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incidents. Failure to consider there may be better methods, or to be open to 
change in order to improve operations and raise values and cultural awareness, 
mean the military never really has to change, which may continue to put lives at 
unnecessary risk.  
 
III   MILITARY INQUIRIES 
The Senate Inquiry 2005 stressed the need for investigating authorities to  
be ‘above any suspicion of partiality’31 and proposed the establishment of an 
independent Australian Defence Force Administrative Review Board 
(‘ADFARB’). The then Howard Government rejected the recommendation, 
instead regulating for a Chief of Defence Force Commission of Inquiry (‘COI’). 
This followed the normal procedure of providing for inquiry bodies via 
regulation when such bodies are dealing with defence.32 The COI was an addition 
to the existing arrangements for appointing investigating officers and boards of 
inquiry. Inquiries are separate from military disciplinary processes and 
administrative sanctions, both of which are possible outcomes from an inquiry 
process. However, inquiry findings, the focus of this article, may inform others 
when making administrative or disciplinary decisions. At times, military  
events have resulted in parliamentary inquiries 33  or appointment of inquiries 
independent of the military.34 A culture of inquiry and review seems prevalent in 
                                                 
31  Senate Inquiry 2005, above n 8, 254 [12.75]. 
32  Department of Defence, ‘Government Response to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
References Committee: Report on The Effectiveness of Australia’s Military Justice System’ (Report, 
Department of Defence, October 2005) 20–1 <http://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/docs/mji_government_ 
response_4oct052.pdf>. See also Defence Legislation Amendment (Military Justice Enhancements – 
Inspector-General ADF) Act 2015 (Cth); Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Regulation 
2016 (Cth). Note that ‘Court of Inquiry’ means any of the following according to Defence (Inquiry) 
Regulations 1985 (Cth) reg 3(1): 
(a)  a General Court of Inquiry under Part II; 
(b)  a Board of Inquiry under Part III; 
(c)  a Combined Board of Inquiry under Part IV; 
(d)  a Chief of the Defence Force Commission of Inquiry under Part VIII. 
33  See, eg, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia, 
Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defence Force (1994); Joint Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia, Military Justice Procedures in the Australian 
Defence Force (1999); Joint Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of 
Australia, Rough Justice? An Investigation into Allegations of Brutality in the Army’s Parachute 
Battalion (2001); Senate Inquiry 2005, above n 8.  
34  See, eg, Kathryn Quinn, ‘Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defence Force’ (Report, Department of 
Defence, 1996) <http://www.defence.gov.au/fr/reports/shinadf.pdf>; Brigadier A R Abadee, ‘A Study 
into the Judicial System under the Defence Force Discipline Act’ (Report, Department of Defence, 1997); 
J C S Burchett, ‘Report of an Inquiry into Military Justice in the Australian Defence Force’ (Report, 
Department of Defence, 2001); Sir Laurence Street and Les Fisher, ‘Report of the Independent Review on 
the Health of the Reformed Military Justice System’ (Report, Department of Defence, 23 January 2004); 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, ‘Women in the Armed Forces: The Role of Women in the 
Australian Defence Force’ (Report, Department of Defence, 23 January 2009) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/fad/women_armed.htm>; Elizabeth Broderick, ‘Review of the 
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the ADF with 24 reviews from 1995 to 2012, 18 being external.35 While it is 
acknowledged that the ADF needs to respond immediately to incidents for 
reasons of operational effectiveness, it is important to address a cultural shift that 
enables the benefits provided by the civilian system’s transparency and equality 
of treatment for all citizens, including soldiers. 
The standard practice where deaths occur in the Australian military is for the 
military to conduct its own internal review of the matter. This can extend to a 
number of different types of inquiry, not including the initial Defence Incident 
Report, which replaced the Quick Assessment (‘QA’) or initial assessment that 
logically takes place.36 Administrative inquiries are created under authority of the 
Defence Act 1903 (Cth) sub-sections 124(1)(gc) and (h), the latter relating to 
IGADF inquiries, and each have different legal and procedural requirements. The 
IGADF has been tasked to undertake inquires relating to the military justice 
system.37 Boards of Inquiry may inquire into accidents and injury, other than 
death, or matters relating to defence assets.38 The COI is mandated where deaths 
of military personnel have occurred, and are not conducted in public unless the 
appointing authority specifically directs otherwise.39 The appointing authority can 
appoint a legal practitioner to assist the COI 40  and the President must have 
judicial experience and be a civilian.41 A COI, and inquiries above an IOI level, 
are used very infrequently.42 It has been reported that:  
There have been 66 service-related deaths in the ADF in the five years prior to April 9, 2014. Of those, 32 occurred in Afghanistan. Only one of those was investigated by a COI, that of the death of a soldier in 2011 in a helicopter crash. Colonel Waddell said the higher level investigation was ordered in that case because it was a ‘major loss of capital equipment’.43 
The most common inquiry used is an IOI which can inquire into any matter 
for which it has been appointed to inquire into and that is under its control. The 
scope of the inquiry is determined by the ADF and such inquiries are closed with 
no evidence taken on oath or affirmation, and no witness examination by 
                                                                                                                         
Treatment of Women at the Australian Defence Force Academy’ (Audit Report, Australian Human 
Rights Commission, July 2013) <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/defencereview/index.html>. 
35 See, eg, Clint Arizmendi, ‘A Culture of Reviews’ (2013) 192 Australian Defence Force Journal 81. 
36  See Department of Defence, ‘The Reporting and Management of Notifiable Incidents’ (Defence 
Instructions (General) 45-2, 26 March 2010); Department of Defence, ‘Incident Recording’ (Defence 
Instructions (General) 67-2, Department of Defence, 1 August 2015); Earley, above n 11; Gyles, above n 
11, 59–61. 
37  Defence Act 1903 (Cth) ss 110C(1), (3), 110DA; Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth); Inspector-
General of the Australian Defence Force Regulation 2016 (Cth). 
38  Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) reg 23; Pt III. Pt IV also provides for the establishment of a 
Combined Board of Inquiry where members of another state’s military forces are involved. 
39  Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) reg 117(2)(a). See also Gyles, above n 11. 
40  Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) reg 51. 
41  Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) reg 112(2)(a)–(b). 
42 See Department of Defence, Defence Publications: Commissions of Inquiry (2016) 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/coi/>.  
43 Elks, above n 4. See also in relation to soldier deaths on Australian territory: Chief of the Defence Force, 
‘Commission of Inquiry Report Concerning the Death of ABBM Ewan Keith McDonald on October 23, 
2011’ (Report, 16 August 2013); Chief of the Defence Force, ‘Commission of Inquiry Report into the 
Death of Private Jacob Lee Lazarus on 19 January 2011’ (Report, 26 May 2013).  
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lawyers.44 Coercive powers enabling gathering of information are provided for by 
the regulations.45 Notwithstanding these developments and the many layers of 
inquiry at significant cost, the question regarding the suitability of the military 
investigating itself remains outstanding.  
Inquiries by the ADF are not preclusive of civilian investigations such as 
coronial inquests,46 although a coroner may, and has, declined to conduct an 
inquest when satisfied that the military inquiry is sufficient.47 Only one other 
civilian inquest into a soldier’s death while stationed overseas has occurred in 
recent times: the inquest into the death of Private Jake Kovco whilst stationed in 
Iraq. That inquest in 2008 attracted considerable controversy for a number of 
reasons, including the need for improvements in weapons handling training, 
scene protection, evidence gathering, investigative abilities and repatriation 
processes.48 In the Milosevic et al inquest, the Queensland Minister for Justice 
and Attorney-General took the rare step of directing the coronial inquest under 
the powers provided by the Coroners Act 2003 (Qld).49 
Undertakings in the form of a memorandum of understanding or a protocol 
between the coroner and any military inquiry have been encouraged, and exist to 
assist cooperation and ensure that the civilian and military systems can operate 
side by side. Protocols created after the Senate Inquiry 2005 aim to ensure 
efficient management of the processes and avoid duplication of effort where the 
circumstances surrounding the death of ADF personnel are investigated.50 To 
facilitate this process further, the Queensland Coroner, for example, has a 
Memorandum of Understanding (‘MOU’) with the ADF.51  
Neither the coronial inquest nor military inquiries is judicial in nature, nor 
subject to the rules of evidence,52 although natural justice applies.53 Both operate 
                                                 
44  Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) regs 72–3. Eligibility to be an Inquiry Officer is provided for in 
Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) regs 70, 70A. The practice with IOIs is appointment of a legal 
officer as an inquiry assistant and thus lawyers are often involved in IOI witness examination. 
45 See, eg, Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) regs 12, 30, 53, 74. See especially reg 12 regarding 
General Court of Inquiry coercive powers in regard to any witness and reg 74 regarding IOI coercive 
powers as it relates to Defence Force personnel.  
46  Federal, State or Territory agencies, such as State or Territory coroners or police, Comcare and the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman can also be involved. 
47 Senate Inquiry 2005, above n 8, 188 [9.30]: ‘Mrs McNess … was distressed by the decision of the 
coroner not to conduct an inquest despite the request by both families that one be held’. 
48 See ABC Radio, above n 7; Brown, above n 7. See also Australian Defence Force Board of Inquiry, 
‘Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Death of 8229393 Private Jacob Kovco at the Secdet 
Accommodation in the Australian Embassy Compound Baghdad on 21 April 2006’ (Report, Australian 
Defence Force, 30 October 2006) <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/kovcoreport.pdf>; Robert 
Payne, ‘“Skylarking”: Homosexual Panic and the Death of Private Kovco’ (2008) 14(2) Cultural Studies 
Review 34. 
49  Milosevic et al (unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland, 22 September 2015) 3 [23] (Deputy State 
Coroner Lock); Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) Pt 3: An inquest can be directed by the Attorney-General: at s 
27(1)(b); and by the Minister: at s 11(4)(b). 
50  See, eg, Chief of the Defence Force, ‘Commission of Inquiry into the Death of Private Edward Alexander 
McBride’ (Report, Australian Defence Force, 31 January 2010) 7 [51]–[52] (‘McBride Inquiry’). 
51  Queensland State Coroner, ‘State Coroner’s Guidelines Chapter 11: Memoranda of Understanding’ 
(Guidelines, Version 2, Queensland Coroner’s Court, November 2014) 2. See also Milosevic et al 
(unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland 22 September 2015) 3 [24] (Deputy State Coroner Lock). 
52  Defence (Inquiry) Regulations 1985 (Cth) reg 50. 
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under an inquisitorial system. In the case of the coronial inquest, in most 
Australian jurisdictions, it is to answer who, how, when, where and what in 
relation to a person’s death, and also to comment on ways to prevent such deaths, 
improve matters of public health or safety, or the administration of justice where 
these may be connected with the death. 54  Military inquiries aim to improve 
processes and operations in the military through lessons learned. The civilian 
coronial inquest and military inquiry are complementary and, for instance, a 
coronial inquest can serve a number of benefits: 
Quite apart from the advantage to the Commission of Inquiry in utilising the expertise available from the Queensland Coroner’s office, an additional usefulness is the perception that a civil authority has been involved in what would otherwise be an all military proceeding. In other Inquiries relatives of deceased service personnel have on occasions been dissatisfied with the ADF proceedings and sought Coronial inquests, expressing them to be a more open type of Inquiry.55  
It may be argued there is value in continuing both processes acknowledging 
that they serve very different purposes: one to inform ADF command in a quick 
and timely manner for operational purposes, and the other to provide public 
accountability and context for families in particular. However, undertaking one 
cannot satisfy the purpose of the other. Anything beyond initial incident 
assessments and operational purposes may be better served by a civilian process. 
Notwithstanding, military inquiries continue to run alongside the civilian inquiry 
mechanism with a difficult overlap occurring. This not only has the potential to 
increase costs but, if operating as a substitute for a civilian inquest, an internal 
military inquiry may continue to be challenged by families of deceased soldiers 
for lack of transparency. It was suggested in 2008 that: 
It is probably too early to make generalised comments concerning the recently instituted Commissions of Inquiry but properly controlled (whilst still according natural justice/procedural fairness) they should become a useful method of providing necessary advice to CDF in a timely and cost effective manner.56 
In 2016, it is clear that the COI has been under-utilised and therefore the 
dissatisfaction of bereaved defence families, in particular, remains. It leaves the 
question: why, if such a process is available, is it not used in circumstances such 
as Milosevic et al when Australian service personnel lose their lives? 
 
                                                                                                                         
53  ‘[T]his does not mean that all rules of evidence may be ignored as of no account … although rules of 
evidence … do not bind, every attempt must be made to administer “substantial justice”’: R v War 
Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228, 256 (Evatt J). 
54 See, eg, Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) ss 45(2), 46(1). See also Coroners Act 1997 (ACT); Coroners Act 2009 
(NSW); Coroners Act 1993 (NT); Coroners Act 2003 (SA); Coroners Act 1995 (Tas); Coroners Act 2008 
(Vic); Coroners Act 1996 (WA). 
55  Andrew Kirkham, ‘Administrative Law as It Affects Commissions of Inquiry’ (Paper delivered at the 
Defence Watchdogs Seminar: ‘Administrative Oversight of Military Justice’, Canberra, 26 November 
2008) 9 <http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/36211/Speech-AndrewKirkham-
DefenceWatchdogsSeminar26Nov08.pdf>. 
56 Ibid 10. See also McBride Inquiry, above n 50, 6 [46]–[50]. 
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IV   THE INCIDENT 
The Australian platoon sent on the mentoring mission to Wahab on 28 
August 2012 was part of an exercise to improve trust between the ANA and the 
international forces after a number of incidents had undermined it.57 Allegations 
concerning soldiers from other states killing civilians,58 mutilating insurgents59 
and disrespecting Afghan customs and religious beliefs had contributed to the 
general atmosphere of tension.60 The filming and distribution of events such as 
US military personnel on Bagram Air base allegedly burning the Koran  
inflamed Afghan people and resulted in riots.61 Koran burning was mentioned by 
Hekmatullah after his arrest when interviewed by Australian journalists.62 
The Australian soldiers were led by Lieutenant Lopez, a junior officer who 
first arrived in Afghanistan in June 2012. While he had conducted several local 
patrols, he had had no previous operational experience.63 After arrival at Wahab 
base on 28 August, the Australians participated in a joint patrol with ANA 
soldiers during which they located a large unexploded device requiring the US 
forces to attend. Conducting the operation in overwhelming 48-degree heat and 
in full protective armour meant the soldiers were relieved when they arrived back 
at base to be allowed to relax and wear Physical Training (‘PT’) dress.64 This 
included the roving guard.65 Soldiers considered this was necessary to rest their 
bodies and air their feet in the extreme conditions.66 
                                                 
57  It was the first time a force element patrol was deployed to Wahab base: Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 18 
[62]. 
58  Taimoor Shah and Graham Bowley, ‘US Sergeant Is Said to Kill 16 Civilians in Afghanistan’, The New 
York Times (online), 11 March 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/asia/afghanistan-
civilians-killed-american-soldier-held.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>; ‘Afghan Soldier Killed at Massacre 
Scene as Afghans Rage on Streets’, Russian Times News (online), 13 March 2012 <http://rt.com/news/ 
afghanistan-massacre-shooter-protest-431/>.  
59  Mark Boal, ‘The Kill Team: How US Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent Civilians’, The Rolling 
Stone (online), 2 March 2011 <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team-20110327# 
ixzz3QBGcmbV7>; Patrick Cockburn, ‘Soldier Who Killed and Mutilated Afghan Villagers is Jailed for 
Life’, Independent News (online), 12 November 2011 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ 
americas/soldier-who-killed-and-mutilated-afghan-villagers-is-jailed-for-life-6261035.html>. 
60  Austin Long, ‘“Green on Blue”: Insider Attacks in Afghanistan’ (2013) 55(3) Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy 167. 
61 Alissa J Rubin, ‘Afghan Protests over the Burning of Korans at a US Base Escalate’, New York Times 
(online), 22 February 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/asia/koran-burning-in-
afghanistan-prompts-second-day-of-protests.html>.  
62 ABC, ‘The Enemy Within’, Four Corners, 27 October 2014 (Quentin McDermott and Clay Hichens) 
<abc.net.au/4corners>. 
63 Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 39 [133]. Lieutenant Lopez was subsequently promoted to Captain: Milosevic 
et al (unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland, 22 September 2015) 9 [54] (Deputy State Coroner 
Lock). Note Captain Lopez is referred to by the rank of Lieutenant throughout this article as that was the 
rank he held at the time of the incident discussed. 
64 Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 18 [63], 35 [118]. See also The Army Dress Manual (15 April 2016) 
Australian Army <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Equipment-and-clothing/Army-Dress-Manual>. 
The policy settles all protocols for army dress. 
65 Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 36 [121]. 
66 Ibid 35 [118]; Milosevic et al (unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland, 22 September 2015) 18 [114]–
[115] (Deputy State Coroner Lock). 
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The order to segregate Australian and ANA soldiers was made difficult by 
the unusual layout and terrain. A decision was made to station the Australians at 
the northwest end of the camp under makeshift tarpaulin shades strung between 
the Australian military vehicles.67 Lieutenant Lopez reported in the IOI that he 
chose not to station Australian soldiers in any of the lookout posts, considering 
that there was insufficient manpower to patrol all of the watch towers, and the 
mission was meant to build trust.68 He stated: 
The first couple of days are all about building a rapport and then seeing the results of that on the ground in the future. There’s such a high degree of trust that you need to place in them with the mission that we have. I was keen to encourage as much interaction as I could, because I believe that facilitates our mission.69 
The atmosphere was described as relaxed and friendly.70 Earlier in the day 
both ANA and Australian soldiers had worked out in a makeshift gym. 
Hekmatullah had participated in this.71 In the evening Australian soldiers played 
cards, watched movies or wrote letters. A roving guard was placed on duty but no 
barrier or stationary guards were in place between the Australian and ANA 
troops. The arrangement of having a roving guard in the evening was supported 
by Sergeant Burke and the section commanders.72 That the roving guard was also 
allowed to wear PT dress was criticised at the IOI.73 The unescorted access by 
ANA soldiers into the Australian area was a matter that Lieutenant Lopez said 
caused him concern, and he had intended to place restrictions on, but admitted 
‘it’s something I didn’t do immediately’. 74  These factors were considered a 
weakness and error of judgment on the part of Lieutenant Lopez, Sergeant Burke 
and Major Gordon, by the IOI.75 
At approximately 9.45pm on 29 August, Hekmatullah, who had been in the 
Australian sector earlier in the evening, went to attend to night guard duty but 
instead walked towards the Australian ‘encampment’ and from approximately 
five metres opened fire with a M16-A2 discharging 26 rounds.76 The scene was 
described as both ‘surreal and chaotic’.77 Two soldiers returned fire, one shooting 
towards the north guard tower and the other towards the southern facing tower. 
No further fire was returned and no other shots were fired by Australians.78 The 
fact the ANA in the watch towers were not shot was credited to the Australian 
soldiers’ professional control in the circumstances.79 
                                                 
67  Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 19 [65], [96]. 
68  Ibid 28 [98]. 
69  Ibid 28 [97](c). 
70  Ibid 35 [118]–[119]. 
71  Ibid 20–1 [70], 34 [114]. 
72  Ibid 28–9 [99]. 
73  Ibid 36 [121]–[122]. 
74  Ibid 33 [112]. 
75  Ibid 34 [116]. 
76  Ibid 2 [4], 10 [36]; Milosevic et al (unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland, 22 September 2015) 1 
[6]–[7] (Deputy State Coroner Lock). 
77 ABC, above n 62. 
78  Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 10 [37]. 
79  Ibid 41 [142]. 
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An ADF Investigative Service Team arrived on the Wahab base within a 
short time of the incident to investigate, and all Australians left the base on 30 
August 2012.80 Hekmatullah escaped, only to be captured in February 2013, after 
a significant search operation.81 After three months he confessed, and was tried 
before an Afghan court and is currently facing the death penalty in Afghanistan.82 
His alleged motives for the shootings included having seen the film of the 
burning of the Koran by US soldiers and the cartoon of the prophet Muhammad.83 
 
V   THE MILITARY INVESTIGATION IN MILOSEVIC ET AL 
The redacted version of the Wahab Inquiry84 indicates a colonel of unknown 
name was appointed to head the Inquiry. An initial Quick Assessment 85  to 
establish the facts was headed by Major Travis Gordon (Officer Commander 
Mentoring Task Unit). Major Gordon was the commanding officer responsible 
for the deployment of the mission and was asked to investigate his own activity. 
This drew criticism from the coroner.86 An investigative team also travelled to 
Afghanistan and between 14 September and 3 October 2012, interviewed 35 
personnel from the Australian and the International Security Assistance Force 
(‘ISAF’).87 The team were prevented from visiting the scene at Wahab base.88 
The IOI drew on documents provided by the Investigative Team in coming to an 
assessment of the incident. The IOI concluded there was no evidence of collusion 
among those interviewed. 89  Unlike civilian investigations where attempts are 
                                                 
80  Ibid 2 [7], 11 [41]. 
81  Ian McPhedran and Patrick Lion, ‘How Super-Spies Tracked Down Rogue Afghan Sergeant 
Hekmatullah’, News Limited (online), 2 October 2013 <http://www.news.com.au/world/how-superspies-
tracked-down-rogue-afghan-sergeant-hekmatullah/story-fndir2ev-1226731791900>. 
82  Milosevic et al (unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland, 22 September 2015) 1 [9] (Deputy State 
Coroner Lock). See also Jeremy Kelly, ‘Afghan Soldier Loses Final Appeal against Death Penalty for 
Murdering Three Australian Troops’, News Limited (online), 27 October 2014 <http://www.news.com.au/ 
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Telegraph (online), 4 May 2015 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11341599/ 
Prophet-Muhammad-cartoons-controversy-timeline.html>.  
84 Wahab Inquiry, above n 5. 
85 The Quick Assessment has been superseded by a Defence Incident Report DI(G) PERS 20-6 Death of 
Australian Defence Force Personnel: see Secretary of Defence, ‘Re-thinking Systems of Inquiry, 
Investigation, Review and Audit in Defence (Stage B): Annex H: Current Defence Reporting 
Requirements’ (Report, Department of Defence, 19 February 2014), which contains an indicative (not 
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criticism of the Quick Assessment, see Secretary of Defence, ‘Re-thinking Systems of Inquiry, 
Investigation, Review and Audit in Defence (Stage B): Annex A: Summary of Observations from 
Brainstorming and Consultation’ (Report, Department of Defence, 19 February 2014). See also Earley, 
above n 11. 
86  Milosevic et al (unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland 22 September 2015) 7 [43] (Deputy State 
Coroner Lock). 
87 Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 7 [21], 8 [22]. 
88  Ibid 7 [20]. 
89  Ibid 8 [22]. 
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made to gather evidence from any relevant witnesses, none of the ANA soldiers 
provided statements.90  
The IOI, in Findings 4 and 5, was unable to determine the reasons 
Hekmatullah attacked the Australian soldiers but ruled out cultural factors. The 
IOI concluded there was no evidence of personal or cultural offence, insulting 
language or behaviour by any Australian soldier. 91  The ‘atmospherics’ were 
considered good. 92  The IOI noted that Hekmatullah had participated in the 
makeshift gym with Australian soldiers earlier in the day. It was also noted that 
Hekmatullah may have been disgruntled as he had not been given leave and 
could not send pay to his wife.93 The IOI determined Hekmatullah’s actions were 
not linked to the Taliban although there was evidence of family sympathies and 
he may have sought their assistance when hiding after the incident.94 This varied 
from the ANA investigation which, in a brief two page report, declared the 
incident a ‘planned terrorist attack’.95 The IOI dismissed this report as providing 
‘insufficient detail and analysis to enable the Inquiry to fully understand the 
report’s findings as presented’.96 
The most significant finding, Finding 6, was that prior to the patrol there was 
no awareness by ADF or Coalition Force members of any intelligence or 
information relating to a specific insider threat and therefore there were no 
weaknesses or deficiencies in intelligence preparation or advice.97 The IOI noted 
that there was no specific discussion of insider threats in the intelligence 
presentation to the mission, but that it was a background matter regularly present 
in daily battle updates as an increase in such attacks had occurred in August 
2012.98 This came under scrutiny by the coronial inquest with a very different 
conclusion being drawn. 
Findings 17 and 18 of the IOI were not approving of the decisions and 
actions taken by two soldiers in relation to the force protection arrangements at 
Wahab, which the IOI found were inadequate to protect from insider attack but 
could not go so far as to find that these decisions and actions were direct or 
indirect causal factors leading to Hekmatullah’s attack. The failure to occupy at 
least one of the towers in the northwest that overlooked the Australians on a 
fulltime basis was determined to be inadequate force protection that placed  
the soldiers at potential significant risk.99 Further, the use of only one guard 
                                                 
90  Ibid 48–9 [166]: the Inquiry noted that the justification for this was ANA commanders would most likely 
prevent individual comment. 
91  Ibid 3 [10], 13 [44], 13 [49]. 
92  Ibid 19 [66]. 
93  Ibid 11–12 [42]–[43]. 
94  Ibid 12–13 [43]. 
95  Ibid 48 [165]. 
96  Ibid 48–9 [166].  
97  Ibid 14 [51]. But see at 22 [77]. 
98 Ibid 14–15 [52]–[53], 17 [58]. See also Roggio and Lundquist, above n 3. 
99  Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 29 [100] (Finding 11). 
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(‘guardian angel’) was heavily criticised100 and found to be an inadequate level of 
force protection.101 
In relation to the state of PT dress the IOI concluded the ‘relaxed tactical 
disposition’ and some personal discipline aspects were not in accordance with 
existing standing operating procedures or tactics, techniques and procedures 
employed by other patrols in Afghanistan.102 Given this, it was reasonable to 
conclude that the Australian soldiers’ state of readiness and response was less 
than could justifiably be expected and was described as ‘complacent’.103 This 
resulted in disciplinary action regarding the inappropriate state of dress of the 
roving picket 104  and a finding that there was a shortfall in decision-making 
regarding the wearing of PT dress. 105  This was despite the soldiers claiming 
having weapons and body armour was sufficient in the overwhelming heat as 
they needed to wind down and rest the body.106 
The IOI made three recommendations. Two were for the Chief of Defence 
Force to consider whether administrative action should be taken against the two 
soldiers in relation to Findings 17 and 18. The third was that a COI would not be 
warranted as there was unlikely to be any new material or evidence uncovered.107 
In conducting the IOI it is noted that the families of those killed were not spoken 
to,108 although they were provided with briefing updates, and the autopsy report 
was not available at the time of the IOI or made available to the parents.109 These 
findings were significantly adjusted by the civilian coronial inquest exposing 
responsibility at a higher level for some of the issues that the IOI had placed with 
lower-order soldiers. 
 
VI   THE RESPONSE 
Following the IOI a number of changes took place within the ADF. These 
included developing a Centre for Army Lessons Learned ‘Inside the Wire’ Green 
on Blue Handbook and educating Australian soldiers on the DSTO Cultural 
Compatibility Study before deployment.110  ISAF also communicated with the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in regard to the green on 
blue attacks.111 As to the effectiveness of these changes, the public are unable to 
                                                 
100  Ibid 30–1 [104]–[105]. 
101  Ibid 31–2 [106] (Finding 12). 
102  Ibid 32 [108]–[110] (Finding 13). 
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107  Ibid 51 [173] (Finding 22). 
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110  Ibid 46 [159](e), (f); Arenas, above n 30. See also Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 
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111  Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 50 [171]. 
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judge as most of the responses are redacted in the IOI report. However, it is 
known that after the IOI, incidents of insider attacks continued.112 Certainly, the 
coroner noted that after the Hekmatullah attack the security posture took 
precedent over the mentoring focus.113 The coroner was concerned around the 
training preparation for mentoring, indicating:  
What I can say is that should there be future mentoring operations undertaken by Australian forces, the ADF should review the training that exists to ensure it is indeed ‘World Best Practice’ … and meets the ‘gold standard’ as characterised by LTCOL Scott.114 
Hugh Poate, Poate’s father, alleged there were serious failures in  
planning and intelligence.115 Fragmentary Order (‘FRAGO’) 13: Force Protection 
Measures to the Inside the Wire Threat had specifically highlighted the 
dangers of green on blue attacks and set a key task as assessing this risk for 
every mission. Despite this, no information or intelligence on this issue, or the 
layout of the base, had been provided to the patrol which had never been to 
Wahab base before. This is so even though the base had been constructed by 
Australians and at least three patrols had previously been to Wahab.116  
Family members rejected the IOI conclusion that it was an unprovoked and 
random attack. Instead they supported the conclusion drawn by the ANA 
assessment of the incident that it was a planned terrorist attack carried out in a 
prepared and calculated manner. It was argued if intelligence had properly been 
communicated to Lieutenant Lopez and a risk assessment carried out as FRAGO 
13 required, then the mission may never have been undertaken, or Major Travis 
Gordon and Lieutenant Lopez may have weighed these things more heavily when 
making decisions as to the level of security to be observed.117 Despite this, the 
IOI and Defence’s own intelligence report concluded there had been no 
intelligence failure, but did concede there was little knowledge about the Wahab 
base and the use of a single roving picket with no watchtower personnel to guard 
the Australian soldiers was concerning.118 
                                                 
112 The incident the subject of this article occurred following prior IOI into ‘green on blue’ attacks in 
October and November 2011 that also had resulted in Australian soldiers’ deaths: Inquiry Officer, 
‘Inquiry Report – Matter Concerning Joint Operations Command’ (Report, Australian Defence Force, 27 
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117 Milosevic et al (unreported, Coroners Court of Queensland 22 September 2015) 14 [86], 15 [92]–[94] 
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118  Wahab Inquiry, above n 5, 30–1 [104]–[106] (Finding 12). 
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The families alleged the communication between Major Gordon and 
Lieutenant Lopez seemed deficient as it relied on certain assumptions. Major 
Gordon assumed Lieutenant Lopez had enough experience and would inform him 
on arrival at the base if there were any concerning issues, and that he would 
ensure the Australian and ANA soldiers were appropriately segregated and force 
protection was adequate. Major Gordon was unaware that Wahab base did not 
allow for adequate separation.119 The Tactical Infrastructure Review by Major 
Gordon was only completed in a cursory manner after the deployment of the 
platoon to Wahab base. Major Gordon had rated the risk of insider attack as low. 
However, an intelligence officer, while sitting in close proximity to Major 
Gordon, was at the same time rating the risk as high.120 The IOI noted that Major 
Gordon inadequately addressed force protection issues with Lieutenant Lopez 
prior to departing for the base, although the IOI could not find this was a causal 
link to the shooting.121 
Further criticism was levelled at Lieutenant Lopez for failure to maintain 
segregation of the ANA and Australian troops. One could think he had a difficult 
task in this given that the mission was to improve trust and relations between the 
two groups. The IOI acknowledged the difficulty a task force commander is put 
in when asked to engage in mentoring activities which are often at odds with 
force protection requirements.122 Local engagement with ANA was a significant 
requirement of the mentoring role.  
The family members of the deceased soldiers were not satisfied with the 
internal IOI, suggesting it raised more questions than it answered. 123  They 
expressed concern that serious intelligence failures were possible and the military 
mission was flawed and not worth the potential loss of life, nor at minimum were 
appropriate safeguard arrangements in place for the Australian soldiers at Wahab 
base.124 Certain family members expressed outrage at the lack of transparency in 
being issued only with the redacted report into the circumstances of the death of 
their loved ones.125 They considered it was about time the army was scrutinised 
by the independent civilian system, so deficiencies could be faced and addressed 
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and accountability and transparency observed to ensure the ADF learnt from 
mistakes and did not risk repeating them.126 
 
VII   THE CORONIAL INQUEST 
In response to the bereaved families’ agitation, a coronial inquest was held in 
Brisbane during 14–21 October 2014. A final report by the coroner, John Lock, 
was delivered on 22 September 2015. The coroner was required to address the 
following issues under section 45(2) of the Coroners Act 2003 (Qld):  
1. The identity of the deceased persons, when, where and how they died 
and what caused their deaths; 
2. The adequacy of the ADF risk mitigation plan along with the execution 
of that plan to prevent green on blue attacks at Wahab Patrol Base; and 
3. Whether any recommendations can be made to reduce the likelihood of 
such deaths in similar circumstances or otherwise contribute to public 
health and safety or the administration of justice. 
A number of important matters relating to the interrelation between the 
military and civilian inquiry mechanisms were addressed by Coroner  
Lock. These included dealing with evidence that was claimed to require  
national security protection while also providing for a transparent and open 
inquiry as demanded by the civilian system;127 dealing with defence ‘jargon and 
acronyms’;128 challenges for the families involved; and the federal/state structure, 
along with the costs involved in the inquest. 
After discussing some of the options that have been proposed for dealing 
with deaths of military personnel in overseas combat zones such as a 
Commonwealth coronial body, the coroner favoured the current state-based 
coronial system. However, the coroner suggested a more neutral proposal for 
consideration of a funding model that supports the costs in such investigations 
where federal issues such as defence deaths are prominent.129 
Regarding the interaction with the families, Coroner Lock’s findings in many 
ways supported the claims made by the family members. He was concerned with 
the lack of transparency and information provided to the families, indicating he 
was also concerned with the decision not to hold a COI.130 Despite the ADF 
refusing to accept the claim that transparency did not exist, the family 
experienced this as a reality. The coroner indicated other regimes survive a more 
open disclosure process which the ADF should reflect on, along with the 
‘therapeutic principles’ involved in a more transparent process.131 
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Significantly, a thread of criticism of more senior level military personnel 
was apparent throughout the coroner’s report. This was not suggested by the IOI 
and internal inquiries and lends support to the claim that inquiring into oneself 
raises the perception of the possibility that lessons are not learned. Failure in 
communication between intelligence and more senior officers exhibiting a ‘tick 
and flick’ attitude, without genuine regard to the threat of insider attacks as 
conveyed by FRAGO 13, was expressed.132 The coroner noted Lieutenant Lopez 
and Sergeant Burke ‘appeared … to be consummate soldiers. They obey 
orders’.133 However, he found the activities of more senior personnel inadequate, 
suggesting ‘failure at a number of levels in the chain of command’.134 
Coroner Lock made a number of recommendations for future  
mentoring missions relating to training: providing for an appropriate balance 
between rapport building and force protection, improvement in the storing  
and dissemination of intelligence, and improvement of communication  
from command to tactical level, and between command and intelligence. 135 
Recommendations were also made for review and improvement in dealing  
with bereaved family members,136 and for the future conduct of such coronial 
inquests.137 
Many of the indications by the coroner for lessons to be learned from this 
case indicate the benefit that could be gained by consideration of factors that 
others, such as the UK system, have already grappled with. For this reason, it is 
suggested that it is useful for Australia to look to the UK experience as discussed 
in the following section. 
 
VIII   THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UK AND BEYOND 
The passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) has placed questions of 
Convention rights squarely before the UK courts. Both the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and the UK courts confirm that human rights run alongside IHL in 
conflicts, particularly when it comes to those detained and under the control of 
UK armed forces in conflict zones outside of the UK.138 Despite this, the UK 
MoD prefers to maintain that IHL is the lex specialis that takes precedence over 
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HRL, with the Convention not applying extra-territorially in armed conflicts.139 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) in 
Hassan v United Kingdom,140 relying on Al-Skeini v United Kingdom,141 advisory 
opinions and judgments of the International Court of Justice,142 concluded in 
relation to international armed conflict: ‘As the Court has observed on many 
occasions, the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and should so far as 
possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which 
it forms part’.143 
The Grand Chamber was concerned to ensure the rights of an individual to 
have access to an effective remedy for any contravention, stating ‘a narrowing of 
the rights of individuals in respect of their treatment by foreign armed forces 
would be unprincipled and wrong’.144 The UK government argued that only the 
Geneva Conventions applied and an individual has no justiciable rights under the 
Geneva Conventions. The Grand Chamber found the detention of the Iraqi 
citizen, Hassan, was arbitrary and not supported under either article 5(1) of the 
Convention or IHL.145 This decision followed Al-Jedda v United Kingdom,146 in 
which the ECHR held that UN Security Council Resolution 1546 could not, 
without very clear language, override obligations under the Convention, and even 
if such language existed the Court should choose an interpretation that enabled 
‘harmony’ between the UN Charter and the Convention.147  
The UK High Court in Mohammed v Ministry of Defence148 found that UK 
detention policy and practice in Afghanistan in a ‘non-international armed 
conflict’ (‘NIAC’) was unlawful, requiring the MoD to compensate Afghanis that 
had been detained ‘in pursuit of military objectives which went beyond the legal 
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powers available to the UK’. 149  In reaching this decision, Leggatt J rejected 
claims by the MoD that the lex specialis was international humanitarian law, and 
that this could operate to qualify human rights law such as article 5 of the 
Convention.150 On appeal to the UK Supreme Court in Al-Waheed v Ministry of 
Defence; Mohammed v Ministry of Defence151 a 7:2 decision found the power to 
detain in a NIAC enabled a Security Council Resolution (‘SCR’) to modify 
article 5(1) (a)–(f) to enable the detention where it was in the words of the SCR 
‘necessary for imperative reasons of security’.152 The need to provide prisoners 
with an effective right to challenge detention (article 5(4)) was still essential.153 
While this judgment brings with it controversy and is likely to face further 
consideration by the Strasbourg courts in due course, what this and other UK 
decisions demonstrate is that the UK courts now engage in deeper consideration 
of matters of war and defence, showing less deference than the executive arm 
may wish.154 The new reality is noted by Sumption LJ: 
Since the Second World War there has been considerable expansion of the range of matters with which international law is concerned … growing importance of the international protection of human rights is one aspect of this change … International law increasingly places limits on the permissible content of municipal law and on the means available to states for achieving even their legitimate policy objectives.155 
This is particularly so where civilians and the right to life are involved.156 
However, the human rights of UK soldiers present a more contested space, and it 
is soldiers and their families’ rights that are the focus of this article.  
 
A   State Duty to Armed Forces Personnel under the Convention  
The duty imposed on the state in relation to its armed forces comes up against 
the special relationship and demands on a soldier required to act in the national 
interest. Article 2 of the Convention imposes on state parties both substantive and 
procedural obligations to protect the right to life and to investigate deaths. The 
substantive obligation involves both a negative duty to refrain from taking life 
without legal justification, and a positive obligation to protect the lives of those 
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within jurisdiction.157 The procedural duty follows from this and it is implied that 
the state will ‘establish a framework of laws, precautions, procedures and means 
of enforcement to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, in order to protect 
life’. 158  This includes initiating an effective public investigation by an 
independent official body into any death occurring in circumstances where it 
appears one or other of the substantive obligations may have been violated and 
where agents of the state may be implicated. 159  That an article 2 argument 
regarding an obligation on the state to protect its soldiers’ lives could be made in 
relation to soldiers in combat relies on the outcome of the controversial decision 
in Smith v Ministry of Defence (‘Susan Smith’),160 in which the Supreme Court, 
following Al-Skeini, accepted that article 2 of the Convention covers UK soldiers. 
This means extraterritorially securing the protection of the right to life for 
soldiers operating ‘beyond the wire’.161 Susan Smith was the first case in which 
the UK civil courts had to consider a positive duty to safeguard soldiers’ lives 
from negligent error when conducting military operations. The Supreme Court, in 
finding that such a positive duty could exist stated: 
the court must avoid imposing positive obligations on the state in connection with the planning for and conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which are unrealistic or disproportionate. But it must give effect to those obligations where it would be reasonable to expect the individual to be afforded the protection of the article. It will be easy to find that allegations are beyond the reach of article 2 if the decisions … [were] closely linked to the exercise of political judgment and issues of policy. So too if they relate to things done or not done when those who might be thought to be responsible for avoiding the risk of death or injury to others were actively engaged in direct contact with the enemy. 
But finding whether there is room for claims to be brought in the middle ground, 
so that the wide margin of appreciation which must be given to the authorities or 
to those actively engaged in armed conflict is fully recognised without depriving 
the article of content, is much more difficult. No hard and fast rules can be laid 
down. It will require the exercise of judgment. This can only be done in the light of the facts of each case.162 
The positive duty to safeguard soldiers’ lives was refined in more detail in 
the case of R (Long) v Secretary of State for Defence163 where the content of the 
‘middle ground’ of the duty of the state to safeguard soldiers’ lives when on 
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active duty and the article 2 obligation to investigate were subjected to further 
scrutiny. In that case, 164  the mother of Corporal Paul Long, Mrs Pat Long, 
brought an action for judicial review in regards to the death of her son, along 
with five other members of the Royal Military Police (‘RMP’), at the hands of a 
mob storming a police station which the soldiers were visiting on 24 June 2003. 
At issue was the suitability of the telecommunication equipment the RMP had 
been issued with, and whether the process for ensuring the correct procedures for 
carrying telecommunication devices had been followed.  
Various military investigations were undertaken. These included a joint 
commanders investigation, designed to get a clear picture of the incident in the 
immediate aftermath and any immediate lessons learned. This investigation 
submitted a report on 8 July 2003 to the Chief of Joint Operations.165 The Land 
Accident Prevention and Investigation team produced a report on 12 March 2004, 
to assist the Board of Inquiry which completed its inquiry on 18 June 2004. As a 
consequence, the Army considered, but rejected, that any disciplinary action was 
required and appointed a Brigadier to report on whether administrative actions 
were appropriate. The Brigadier recommended administrative action should be 
considered against two individuals. This recommendation was rejected by the 
Chief of Staff of the relevant area as it could be seen as ‘apportioning blame’ to 
individuals and 
administrative sanctions … not originally designed for operational context – may actually harm long-term operational effectiveness because of the signal that it would send … that we are not prepared to tolerate mistakes … [making us] too risk averse.166  
Finally, a coronial inquest held in March 2006 found that all six soldiers had 
been unlawfully killed and raised issues regarding the availability of effective 
communication devices.167 
The families, not satisfied with this, sought a civilian police investigation 
which ended back with a further internal military review concluding no further 
investigation was necessary. After the families were informed of this in October 
2007, they remained unsatisfied, seeking an application before the ECHR. This 
was rejected in March 2010, the court declaring the case inadmissible for not 
having exhausted local remedies.168  
In what is becoming a familiar refrain, the families were concerned that there 
had not been an independent and transparent inquiry, and persisted in bringing a 
claim for judicial review before the civil courts in the UK. Initially the claim was 
rejected based on the delay in bringing the hearing, but a renewed application by 
Mrs Long succeeded in having the matter argued before Justice Leggatt.169 While 
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accepting that Long fell within ‘the middle ground’ described by the Supreme 
Court in Susan Smith, the Divisional Court did not accept that every case falling 
within the ‘middle ground’ would require an investigation satisfying article 2.170 
Leggatt J made the distinction between ECHR jurisprudence171 requiring an 
article 2 investigation to address the identification and punishment of those 
responsible as applicable in the context of cases involving the positive duty to 
protect life when state agents are accused of unlawful killing, and the situation in 
Long where unintentional negligent omission was involved: 
a duty to protect the lives of individual soldiers by safeguarding them from the risk of a negligent failure in the chain of command to ensure compliance with a particular order would be to impose a duty that was wholly unrealistic, excessively burdensome and calculated to impede the work done by the armed services in the national interest.172 
In the situation of negligent omission, criminal sanctions are not the outcome 
sought and civil redress in the form of a damages claim is sufficient.173 As no 
substantive breach of article 2 was found, there was no duty to investigate. 
Further, the Divisional Court held if there was a duty to investigate, this had been 
satisfied by the various internal military investigations and the civilian inquest.174 
The Court addressed the considerable delay, being 11 years since the deaths, 
stating ‘the time for learning any lessons from failings in this area has … long 
passed’175 and ‘we do not think it reasonable to expect the state to institute such 
an investigation now, more than a decade after the soldiers’ deaths, and some 
eight years after the inquest’. 176  Most importantly, the court considered any 
shortcomings in the ability of the military investigation to satisfy article 2 were 
overcome by the coronial inquest.177  
Unsatisfied, Mrs Pat Long proceeded to take the matter to the Court of 
Appeal. In 2015, the Court of Appeal178 refused Mrs Long’s claim for a fresh 
investigation, accepting the Divisional Court’s findings that the military inquiry 
and coroner’s inquiry satisfied article 2 investigative purposes for lessons 
learned,179 or if they did not, then the number of years lapsed meant the likelihood 
of any useful information for lessons learned was low, and a fresh inquiry would 
not be justified.180 In contrast to the Divisional Court, however, was the Court of 
Appeal’s acceptance that the circumstances surrounding Corporal Long’s death 
gave rise to a positive obligation on the state to safeguard the lives of members of 
its military.181 The Court of Appeal accepted that there was a failure in the system 
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of control and chain of command, rather than an isolated incident, in ensuring 
observance of a standing order on use of communications equipment. This 
activated article 2 and the duty to have an article 2 investigation as to why a 
practice had developed that enabled a routine ignoring of the standing order.182 
The families in Long were seeking, amongst other things, to hold individuals 
accountable. The facts related to alleged negligence and a communication failure 
in the chain of command. The Divisional Court supported the MoD reasoning for 
resisting individual accountability in this situation, referring to combat immunity: 
meaning exemption from tortious liability for injuries arising during combat. 
This is one reason the threat of an article 2 investigation may have adverse 
impacts on operational effectiveness.183 The Court of Appeal, while noting that 
the scope of an article 2 investigation depends on the individual circumstances of 
a matter,184 in this case held the military inquiry and the coroner’s inquest had 
sufficiently revealed the facts to satisfy the purpose of an article 2 
investigation.185  
Long must be read with the Supreme Court reasoning in Susan Smith that 
combat immunity cannot be used as a general ground for avoiding considering 
article 2 obligations, but rather each case must be individually assessed.186 Long 
addresses the ‘middle ground’ referred to by the Supreme Court in Susan 
Smith.187  
The Convention requirement of state parties to prevent and suppress offences 
against the person, when that person is a military member, was outlined in 
Stoyanovi v Bulgaria,188 where the ECHR held it must be established: 
that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.189 
The ECHR in Stoyanovi190 rejected an application by the family of a soldier 
who died during a parachute exercise despite accepting there were deficiencies in 
communication between a helicopter crew and the paratroopers.191 The Court 
distinguished between risks a soldier must expect to incur within ordinary 
military duties and ‘“dangerous” situations of specific threat to life which arise 
exceptionally from risks posed by violent, unlawful acts of others or man-made 
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or natural hazards’.192 An operational obligation would only arise in the latter 
situation: 
in the present case, parachute training was inherently dangerous but an ordinary part of military duties. Whenever a State undertakes or organises dangerous activities, or authorises them, it must ensure through a system of rules and through sufficient control that the risk is reduced to a reasonable minimum. If nevertheless damage arises, it will only amount to a breach of the State's positive obligations if 
it was due to insufficient regulations or insufficient control, but not if the damage 
was caused through the negligent conduct of an individual or the concatenation of 
unfortunate events.193 
The claimants in Stoyanovi were not alleging ‘that any specific risk to life … 
arose that should have been foreseen in advance’.194 This, if Convention-like 
requirements applied in Australia, would in cases such as Milosevic et al, draw 
consideration to the existence of FRAGO 13.195 Lieutenant Lopez had not been 
advised of FRAGO 13 which had been issued two and half weeks in advance, 
foreseeing the need to take extra precautions against frequently occurring insider 
attacks. 196  Nor indeed was it the situation in Australia in Comcare v 
Commonwealth,197 where findings of systemic failure occurred in relation to a 
heat stroke death, resulting in an order to pay compensation under workplace 
relations laws for a situation that the ADF was aware of and indeed should have 
anticipated.198 It was argued in Comcare that ‘[t]he ADF had for some time been 
aware of the risk of serious heat injury … For reasons which are not clear, little 
regard was paid to the risk … There was systemic disregard … [and this] was a 
serious failure’. 199  The applicant referred to findings of the Charles report, 
including that the failure could be attributed to a lack of proper equipment or 
adequately trained medical personnel being present in a climate in which 
‘training overrode all other considerations’.200 Madgwick J, sympathising with 
these arguments, felt strongly about the situation, noting: ‘Had this case occurred 
in the private sector, a criminal prosecution of at least the employer would  
have been likely’.201 Perhaps fortunately for the ADF the Convention article 2 
obligations do not apply in Australia. The Army in Comcare affirmed it was not 
required by law to submit to the jurisdiction of the Northern Territory Coroner, 
notwithstanding that it placed in mitigation the fact it had voluntarily done so.202 
The requirements for conducting coronial inquests in the UK that are article 2 
compliant were clarified in R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner.203 This case 
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indicated that the inquest must go beyond ‘how’ the death happened, in the sense 
of ‘by what means’ to include wider considerations assessing the ‘circumstances’ 
leading to the death. Lord Bingham in the House of Lords in R (Amin) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department204 summarised the duty:  
To ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save the lives of others.205 
This has caused some concern in the UK as ‘[i]n the absence of full criminal 
proceedings, and unless otherwise notified, a coroner should assume that [the] 
inquest is the means by which the state will discharge its procedural investigative 
obligation under article 2’.206 In so doing the coroner may now need to inquire 
into matters the MoD considers as its domain alone. In Susan Smith,207 Mrs Smith 
relied upon the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) to argue the state owed her son, a 
soldier in Iraq, a duty to respect his right to life under article 2 of the Convention 
and that any inquest had to satisfy the procedural requirements of the article. The 
Court confirmed any inquest must satisfy article 2 requirements.208 This includes 
the need for a timely public hearing, initiated by the government’s own motion, 
in which victims’ families can fully participate in an effective investigation in 
order to determine whether any force used was justified, and to identify and 
punish those found responsible.209 
Notwithstanding this, there has been criticism of the UK government in 
failing to ensure resources and legislative requirements in coronial inquests fulfil 
the Convention’s demands. Two cases concerning deaths in Northern Ireland at 
the hands of police and soldiers, in which article 2 procedural investigative 
obligations had not been met due to extensive delays, confirm the UK still has 
further to go.210 Coronial inquests in Australia follow a similar requirement to 
address the circumstances surrounding a death. For this reason, a coronial inquest 
is more likely to be sought by bereaved families in relation to soldiers’ deaths 
when they feel the internal military inquiries serve a different purpose that does 
not satisfy their needs. 
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IX   CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INQUIRIES INTO DEATHS OF SOLDIERS 
Mrs Pat Long’s 11 year battle to seek a transparent civilian investigation in 
the UK speaks of the parents of deceased soldiers’ pain in bereavement. Lebel211 
has done extensive research on the impact that bereaved families of military 
personnel can have on the military organisation and wider civilian society within 
the Israeli context. He notes a distinct shift in the 1990s from what he refers to as 
the security–political complex, securing to the army a hegemonic status which he 
describes as excluding civil–public discourse in regard to the elite within the 
security–political complex. Bereaving parents under this complex were seen to 
support collective nationalistic formulae in which bereavement was mediated by 
legislation governing military cemeteries and commemoration, in return for 
which the parents suppressed their pain for the greater good of soldier morale and 
the heroic status accorded ‘fallen soldiers’.212 Questioning the circumstances of 
their children’s deaths was not contemplated in such an environment.213  
Lebel suggests the beginning of change, to what he describes as the ‘civil 
diversity model’ of parental bereavement, occurred when the unpopular Yom 
Kippur War in 1973 resulted in significant numbers of casualties leading to 
civilian protests against the war.214 It took another two decades before significant 
changes toward a ‘confrontational victim’ space occurred, in which parents 
challenged the conduct of military operations utilising the civilian courts and the 
media. Lebel describes the marked change in the jurisprudence of the Israeli 
High Court of Justice in the 1990s as a result of the introduction of rights through 
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation.215 The Israeli High Court gave these Basic Laws constitutional status 
and priority over ordinary laws.216  The change from patriotic collectivism to 
individualism and rights enabled the Court to become a source of support for 
those seeking to question the activities of the security–political elite in a 
transparent manner that civil society had not previously experienced in Israel.217 
The combination of media reporting, ability to access and enforce rights in a 
civilian court as an independent public body, and a bereaved mother in 1991218 
led to an overcoming of the norms of heroism and suppressed pain of parents of 
deceased soldiers. This combination of factors resulted in public challenges to the 
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conduct of the military. Lebel describes defence’s opposition to the parents by 
attempting to ‘subvert’ and undermine their calls for external investigations that 
demanded norms of transparency, accountability and openness.219 Lebel states the 
Israel Defence Force’s ‘poor behavior accumulated into an impression of 
ubiquitous systemic incompetence: an inability to learn from mistakes, 
whitewashing negative findings, unfair treatment of recruits, and a lack of 
professionalism’.220 
Lieutenant General David Morrison, former Chief of Army has noted the 
impact of individualism and rights assertions within the Australian army, stating: 
Part of our subjection to the law of our land must reflect the recognition of individual rights, and the balancing of those rights with the exercise of judicial and executive power … it is the introduction of the concept of the individual, and their rights vis-a-vis the exercise of prerogative power (especially in the context of military discipline), that defines the modern discourse … Nonetheless, it seems to me that balance has shifted in an alarming way. I would suggest that the pendulum has swung towards the individual to a point which is now having a very practical and immediate effect on our ability to command.221 
The requirement of the Coroners Act 2003 (Qld) to look also to the 
circumstances (much like the Convention article 2 requirements) means a more 
than cursory inquiry is demanded into the obligations on the ADF, in 
circumstances where there was knowledge of increased ‘green on blue’ attacks 
occurring, in a transparent and public domain.222 The unique purpose a coroner 
serves in a democracy by providing public transparency around deaths and 
accommodating sensitivity for grieving family members is embedded in the 
historical institution. 223  The UK has acknowledged the important role of a 
coronial inquest in addressing family bereavement with the introduction of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK).224 Although the UK and Israel are different 
societies, there are lessons here for the ADF. The learning is enlightening when 
considering the sentiments echoed by the family demands in Milosevic et al for 
transparency and accountability in which the military should put in place greater 
safeguards to ensure there is no longer any chance of actual or perceived bias 
through internal investigation into cases in which deaths have occurred.225 The 
bereaved parents of soldiers can shape public opinion in a powerful way. While 
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Australia may not have reached the level of rights based protection existing in the 
UK and Israeli law, the engagement in multinational forces and the opening up of 
review of military conduct in these nations cannot escape notice, nor impact, in 
Australia. 
Australia has certain rights legislation at the federal level,226 but there remains 
no overarching rights legislation that bereaved Australian families can rely on.227 
Nevertheless, both the Australian Capital Territory228 and the state of Victoria229 
have human rights instruments, and there is a growing agitation for greater rights 
following other Western states. The coronial inquest and the response of the 
families discussed in this article signify a furtherance of changes called for since 
the Senate Inquiry 2005. The Senate then called for the establishment of an 
independent Australian Defence Force Administrative Review Board,230 stating: 
there appears to be no mechanism in place to ensure that the requirements set down in Defence regulations and instructions are rigorously enforced. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the ADF has had little success in removing the perception that administrative inquiries lack impartiality and independence.231 
A subsequent audit in 2006 of the ADF investigative ability produced a less 
than satisfactory report card of the service police, citing lack of investigative 
experience, capacity, skill and impartiality producing untimely and inferior 
quality evidentiary material.232 
The UK is grappling with push back by the security–political complex, with 
calls in the 2014–15 Defence Committee Report for strong and strategic 
legislative changes that will give the military more ability to conduct its affairs 
behind a veil of protection.233 The Report appeals to the cost of scrutiny and the 
ability to serve public national interest with genuine protection if soldiers’ hands 
are tied by the intrusion of the civilian courts, media and an individual rights 
mentality. On the other hand, the families in Milosevic et al felt pressure from the 
military during the coroner’s inquest.234  
A rise in claims to ‘lawfare’ like this are often heard.235 Lawfare alleges legal 
interventions and court cases burden the ability of the military to maintain 
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operational effectiveness. 236  However, what must be acknowledged is that a 
country under the rule of law means ‘the country is bound, in any event, to 
comply with the decisions of the court in obedience to the rule of law’.237 It must 
also be remembered that the legislature invites the courts to adjudicate rights 
matters. These concerns – if unaddressed – reflect a potential for divide occurring 
in CMR. This has important consequences for future conduct of ADF operations. 
 
X   CONCLUSION 
The Milosevic et al inquest saw the coroner uncover complacency in the 
senior ranks of military leadership that the military inquiry system did not. These 
events suggest sometimes blame is placed on junior ranks or, as argued by 
counsel for the ADF, dismissed as a factor of conflict: ‘Sadly, but inevitably, 
combat operations cause death and injury’.238 This process opens the possibility 
that genuine lessons are not gained and change does not readily occur. 
That a fundamental cultural shift in the ADF is required is suggested by these 
events. Such a shift would obviate the almost ongoing review culture.239 It is time 
for a brave next step in the civilianisation process if the gap in civil–military 
values and relations is not to widen. Moving towards civilian inquiries is that 
next step. Civilian integration will improve accountability, operational 
effectiveness, reduce the likelihood of litigation as well as the pain and cost to 
families of deceased members. Australia would do well to heed the call, taking 
account of former Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Morrison’s 
acknowledgment that ‘legal frameworks [must] cope with a much more 
individualistic workforce’,240 together with the experience of other democracies. 
Despite the major ‘Rethinking Systems of Inquiry, Investigation, Review and 
Audit in Defence’ in 2011, and the recent legislative amendments, the 
adjustments and recommendations tend to be piecemeal and slow to see fruition. 
Often change is attempted with minimal disruption to the current structures, 
resulting in complex layering and unclear outcomes with much that still does not 
overcome the inherent challenges raised here. As Coroner Lock stated: ‘To be 
effective, open disclosure has to become part of the culture of the organisation, 
requires planning and needs to be conducted by appropriately trained persons’.241 
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Ignoring the Senate Inquiry 2005 recommendation to establish the ADFARB, 
and notwithstanding subsequent reviews, there remains a duplication of matters 
in an expensive process with rather complicated MOU requiring the military 
inquiry process and coroners to work together. While this relationship is 
currently respectful, it may not always be so and it would be foolish to disregard 
the issues. Australia needs to keep abreast of the developments in other states. 
Further research is required with a re-imagining of the current inquiry system 
beyond the 2011 changes. This article has argued more reputational damage to 
the ADF and cost to the Australian public will occur while continuing reaction 
against this inevitable change persists. Taking, and learning, lessons from other 
states’ experiences may reduce some of the pain, cost and loss of regard their 
military forces have had to face.  
 
 
 
